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GLD-148        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3001 
___________ 
 
WARREN K. GLADDEN, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS J. VILSACK,  
SECRETARY US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5-10-cv-05228) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 29, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 27, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Warren K. Gladden sued the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, alleging 
that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and age when he was not 
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considered for a position in the United States Forest Service.  The District Court 
dismissed his complaint on the Secretary’s motion, concluding that Warren could not 
state a prima facie case for race- or age-discrimination based on his allegations and the 
attachments to the complaint.  (Specifically, the District Court concluded that the 
information that he presented showed that he was not considered for the position only 
because he was not within the sufficiently large pool of qualified applicants who were 
already federal employees.)   
 Warren appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review 
is plenary.  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  On 
review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because no substantial 
question is raised by this appeal.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII on 
the basis of race or age, a plaintiff must show that he or she is a member of a protected 
class, was qualified for the position, was not hired, and that, under circumstances that 
raise an inference of discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out 
individuals with qualifications similar to the plaintiff’s to fill the position.  See Sarullo v. 
United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).  Whereas Title VII claims 
can be maintained with a showing that an improper consideration was a motivating factor 
for the employer’s action, see Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 
(2009), a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) requires a 
showing that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action,”  id. at 2351.  
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However, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not establish the elements of a 
prima facie case; a plaintiff merely must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.”  Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citations 
omitted). 
We accordingly turn to Warren’s complaint to see if he pleaded “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  See 
also Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176-
177 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the Twombly/Iqbal standard).  As we have noted 
previously, Twombly’s “plausibility paradigm . . . applies with equal force to analyzing 
the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.”  Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing 
Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
Warren alleges that he is a member of a protected class based on his race and age.  
Construing all inferences in his favor, we will take his allegations about his education and 
experience to mean that he was qualified for the open position.  We also note that he 
described the hiring of a younger, white woman for the position.  However, based on his 
own allegations and his attachments to his complaint, Warren did not suggest that the 
employer declined to hire him under circumstances that raise an inference of 
discriminatory action.  He essentially took issue with the fact that the employer 
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considered only eligible candidates who applied through the job announcement for 
current and former federal government employees (“federal employees”).  He 
complained that he was not hired because federal employees were considered before 
outside candidates.  He did not allege that he was treated differently from others who 
applied through the same job announcement that he used, which was for persons other 
than federal employees.  In fact, he alleged that all who applied with him under the same 
job announcement received the same treatment.  The discrimination between candidates 
who were federal employees and those who were not is not the discrimination Title VII 
or the ADEA protects against.  In short, as the District Court concluded, Warren did not 
state a plausible claim for discrimination on the basis of age or race.   
For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.      
